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Book Reviews 
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE POLICE: 
TWO SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT? 
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868. 
By Andrew E. Taslitz. 1 New York, New York University 
Press. 2006. Pp. xi +363. $50.00. 
Donald A. Dripp/. 
Andy Taslitz is one of the most thoughtful and prolific 
members of the legal academy writing on issues in criminal jus-
tice. In this lively volume he links current issues in Fourth 
Amendment law to the Constitution's two great formative peri-
ods, the founding era of 1789-1791 and the reconstruction period 
that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Broadly 
speaking he believes that current doctrine slights such important 
values as community self-government, freedom of movement 
and freedom from public humiliation, and bolsters his critique of 
modern law with historical evidence suggesting the importance 
of these values to the Framers of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
amendments. 
I have two basic criticisms. The first is that the book ne-
glects the dynamic character of criminal justice throughout the 
nineteenth century. A central difficulty in fathoming the rela-
tionship between the Fourteenth Amendment and criminal jus-
tice is that the framing took place more or less in the middle of a 
radical transformation of the criminal justice process-a process 
I call the first criminal procedure revolution. 
1. Professor. Howard UniversitY School of Law. 
2. Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
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Unlike the second revolution engineered by the Warren 
Court, legislatures rather than courts led the way. They took the 
system inherited from the English common law, a system based 
on private investigation and prosecution overseen by justices of 
the peace with a dominant role for the gallows in the penalty 
structure, and remade it utterly. Nineteenth century legislatures 
made fundamental institutional changes, by establishing para-
military municipal police forces, public prosecutors with a func-
tional monopoly on charging decisions, and a new system of pun-
ishment based on the penitentiary. They also made dramatic 
changes in legal doctrine and practice, bypassing the grand jury 
in favor of accusation by information, giving defendants the right 
to testify (and the risk that juries would convict them because 
they declined to do so), and made cross-examination rather than 
competence the central principle of evidence law. All of these 
changes were championed by the utilitarian reformer Jeremy 
Bentham, and while historians may quibble about just how much 
personal influence Bentham had, it remains fair to refer to these 
changes as Benthamite reforms. 
Many of these changes, such as authorizing defense testi-
mony and accusation by information in felony cases, were, and 
were understood as, direct attacks on the common law criminal 
justice system. The debate over these reforms was vigorous and 
prominent, and it went on before, during, and after the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. No history of the relation-
ship between the Fourteenth Amendment and search-and-
seizure should ignore, as Tastlitz does, the evolving nature of the 
criminal justice system to which the new constitutional provision 
was to apply. 
My second criticism requires far less exposition. I don't 
know how the law would change if the Justices of the Supreme 
Court read his book and unanimously agreed with it. I know that 
particular cases Taslitz discusses would have come out differ-
ently, but the vagueness of his interpretive premises and the 
generality of the principles he derives from his reading of history 
generate a normative framework that doesn't determine or even 
strongly imply a particular outcome on important issues. Most of 
the fault here lies with the Framers, who chose two clauses to 
regulate search-and-seizure, one far too general and the other 
far too rigid. It is still fair to say that distilling from history prin-
ciples as broad and in as much tension with one another as lib-
erty and community is not likely to alter how readers feel about 
stop-and-frisk or search-incident-to-arrest. 
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Part I of this review summarizes the book. Parts II and III 
develop more fully the two criticisms just introduced. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment consists of 12 chap-
ters, organized as an introduction and two parts. The first part, 
"Political Violence and the Original Fourth Amendment" argues 
that modern law's tolerance of broad police powers conflicts 
with founding-era values and with the amendment's textual 
commitment to a corporate "right of the people." Chapter 2, 
"Violence as Political Expression," makes Taslitz's central 
claims about founding-era history. Taslitz points out (pp. 18-23) 
that the Founders revered the rulings in Entick v. Carrington and 
Wilkes v. Wood'- cases in which the court ruled that executive-
issued warrants to search for private papers furnished no defense 
to soldiers defending trespass suits. He also points to the Foun-
ders' approval of broad search powers when authorized by colo-
nial legislature, as distinct from those authorized by the English 
Parliament in which America had no representation (pp. 23-36). 
Finally, he argues that one reason why the Founders detested 
general warrants was the insult or humiliation that accompanied 
their execution (pp. 36-44). State violence, according to Taslitz, 
has an expressive as well as a functional dimension. State vio-
lence against the individual absent individualized justification, he 
argues, treats the victim as a thing, not a person. 
Chapter 3 builds on the premise that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires "individualized justice" as a sign of official respect 
for the citizen. How much suspicion must state actors have be-
fore searching or seizing? Taslitz argues that the common law 
warrant process required rather stronger antecedent suspicion 
than current doctrine. The affiant had to have personal knowl-
edge, and was accountable in tort if the suspected items were not 
found (p. 49). Moreover, according to Taslitz, the eighteenth 
century justice of the peace "was a man of stature expected in-
dependently to assess the adequacy of the grounds for probable 
cause." (p. 49, footnote omitted). The Fourth Amendment, 
therefore, "loosened common-law search and seizure standards" 
by dispensing with the requirement that the suspected stolen or 
contraband goods be both present at the place to be searched 
3. Entick v. Carrington. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765): 
Wilkes v. Wood. 19 How. St. Tr. 1153.98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763). 
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and in fact stolen or contraband (p. 49). Nonetheless there was 
substantial continuity between the common law and the constitu-
tional amendment: "What matters most, however, is that prob-
able cause required specific, trustworthy information to make 
real the implicit aspiration toward individualized justice" (p. 49, 
footnote omitted). 
Taslitz's treatment of the origins of the Fourth Amendment 
is tantalizing; he mentions but does not cite anti-Federalist com-
plaints about the pro-government features of the proposed 
amendment (p. 49). He does not discuss the founding era views 
on a related and arguably more interesting question, namely on 
whether mere evidence, including private papers, would be sub-
ject to search and seizure even pursuant to a valid warrant. En-
tick v. Carrington had held that at common law no warrant could 
be issued to seize private papers not stolen or otherwise contra-
band (i.e. "mere evidence," private property useful to the gov-
ernment as proof, not the corpus delicti). If it should turn out 
that Boyd v. United State/ correctly read the original under-
standing, originalist justices would be required to rethink a 
hugely important body of modern law-the one authorizing sei-
zure or subpoena of business records, including computer re-
cords. 
Chapter 3 also sets out one of the many methodological 
equivocations that run through the book. Taslitz, his emphasis 
on history notwithstanding, is not an originalist. "To see the 
Fourth Amendment as justifiably informed by the common law," 
he writes, "is, therefore, to see the amendment as embodying a 
fundamental set of principles subject to evolution to fit individ-
ual fact situations and new social circumstances" (p. 53). In an 
earlier article, he wrote that: 
Examining history can serve the same moral function as does 
studying current social practices in highlighting how we fall 
short of our moral ideals. History can also reveal repeating 
patterns, uncover intergenerational grievances and depths of 
feeling, and expose moral controversies whose resolution led 
to new law, thus informing moral sensibilities in a war that a 
concentration on current social practices alone cannot.-
4. Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (statute presuming truth of forfei-
ture allegations upon failure of claimants to produce relevant business records violates 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments). 
5. Andrew E. Taslitz. Respect and the Fourth Amendment. 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMIN. 15. 57 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
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History, then, informs but does not control. It provides modestly 
privileged reasons to prefer one result over another. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are titled, respectively, "Modern Implica-
tions 1" and ''Modern Implications 2." Chapter 4 concerns itself 
with institutional distributions of authority to resolve search-
and-seizure disputes. Parting company with Thomas Davies, the 
author of the leading article, Taslitz sees special significance in 
the textual reference to "the right of the people"' and the divi-
sion of labor between the warrant clause and the reasonableness 
clause (p. 56). While legislatures usually speak for "the people,. 
in our democratic system, Taslitz sees a role for both direct 
popular participation in Fourth Amendment law and a special 
role for the courts. Popular participation should take the form of 
jury decision in tort suits against the police (p. 60). and in the 
formulation of police policies in a more transparent and open 
administrative process (pp. 60-61 ). 
Taslitz sees the dominant institutional player in Fourth 
Amendment disputes as the judiciary. History shows that the co-
lonial judges resisted issuing general warrants. Judicial power to 
review executive branch search and seizure practices. however. 
should not be limited to passing on warrant applications. Ex post 
review of those practices. via the exclusionary rule. "return[ s] 
the parties to the status quo ante as primarily a benefit to the 
People because it regulates the state's use of political violence" 
(p. 66) (emphasis in original). The exclusionary rule, moreover, 
provides the judiciary with a means of defending itself against 
interbranch poaching by the executive (p. 67). And whether 
speaking through suppression motions. damage actions, or suits 
for injunctive relief, the judges play the role of "robed teachers'' 
(p. 53) looking over the shoulders of those in the political 
branches. 
Having placed special responsibility in the courts in Chapter 
4, in Chapter 5 Taslitz offers a general approach he believes 
courts ought to follow in Fourth Amendment cases. He distills 
seven lessons from history (p. 71 ). The list is too long to be re-
produced, but it emphasizes the inherently expressive. and po-
tentially insulting or humiliating, character of state violence; the 
linkage between security from search and arrest and freedom of 
expression; the emotional nature of the Fourth Amendment's 
origins; the importance of involving "the People'" in shaping the 
amendment's application; and the importance of individualized 
justice, which Taslitz sees as largely compatible with efficient law 
enforcement. Tastlitz then applies these principles to some con-
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troversial Supreme Court cases. Illustratively, he approves of Il-
Linois v. Lidster,6 upholding a suspicionless roadblock to seek 
witnesses to a prior hit-and-run in the area, and disapproves of 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,7 upholding the warrantless arrest 
of a motorist for the nonjailable misdemeanor offense of failing 
to wear a seat belt. In Lidster the expressive character of the 
state's violence was not stigmatizing or humiliating; in Atwater it 
was. 
In Part II of the book, Taslitz links the Fourth Amendment 
to the Fourteenth. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 discuss the incompati-
bility of the Fourth Amendment with the institutional apparatus 
of slavery-tolerance of private violence intended by whites to 
subordinate blacks as a class, the prohibition on unauthorized 
movement by slaves, and the slave patrols that enforced the pro-
hibition with sweeping discretionary powers of search and sei-
zure. Chapter 10 discusses antebellum attitudes held by slaves, 
slave-owners, and Northerners respecting privacy and property. 
Taslitz draws a sharp distinction between the Southern concep-
tion of rights that varied radically according to race and class, 
and a more universal and egalitarian conception held by at least 
some Northerners. Chapter 11 connects this discussion to consti-
tutional law, by arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment se-
cured the fruits of Northern victory in the civil war by writing a 
more universal and egalitarian vision of rights into our organic 
law. 
Taslitz argues that the abuses against which the Fourteenth 
Amendment was aimed should inform modern readings of the 
Fourth Amendment (presumably including federal cases). He 
writes that: 
The overwhelming weight of historians' opinions leaves little 
doubt that the framers, and probably the ratifiers, of the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood that it would apply the 
Fourth Amendment to the states, protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures being among the "privileges 
and immunities" of U.S. citizens. Moreover, the vast majority 
of Black Code provisions and the many other acts of Southern 
counterrevolution involved searches and seizures. Everything 
from unjustified arrests, mandated passes to move about the 
countryside, beatings by state officials, legally authorized 
whippings, banishment, revived patrols, and invasions of 
homes encroached on fundamental rights to unimpeded lo-
6. 540 u.s. 419 (2004). 
7. 532 u.s. 318 (2001). 
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comotion, privacy and possession and use of property, absent 
adequate justification, such as because of probable cause or 
involvement in a crime. Furthermore, search and seizure is-
sues frequently arose in the context of state seizure of freed 
people's firearms, firearms partly needed by the former 
bondsmen to protect themselves from white violation. (p. 
248). 
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This passage, which includes no citations, is deceptively simple, 
because it ignores the different ways in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment might prohibit the kinds of arbitrary searches and 
seizures used to continue the subordination of the freed slaves 
during Reconstruction. 
One way is indeed to read privileges-and-immunities as in-
cluding the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. It is also 
possible, however, to read the privileges-and-immunities clause 
as an equality provision analogous to Article IV's privileges-or-
immunities clause, i.e., requiring the states to provide black and 
white citizens the same rights against searches and seizures.8 An-
other possibility is to read due process as prohibiting extra-
judicial punishment, of which arbitrary arrests, beatings and 
home invasions are examples.9 
The theories seem similar, but they are not. On the straight-
ahead incorporation theory apparently embraced by Taslitz, the 
warrant clause would operate against the states. On the equality 
reading states could set aside the warrant requirement whenever 
8. A thesis ably advanced by John Harrison. Reconstructing the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). Harrison summarizes his argument as fol-
lows: 
My main thesis rests on a distinction. central during Reconstruction and still 
familiar today. between substantive and equality-based constitutional limita-
tions. A substantive protection either prescribes or forbids a certain content of 
state law. An equality-based protection. by contrast. says nothing about the sub-
stance of the state's law: it instead requires that the law. whatever it is. be the 
same for all citizens. I argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is. with re-
spect to everyday rights of state law. the latter kind of protection. The main 
point of the clause is to require that every state give the same privileges and 
immunities of state citizenship-the same positive law rights of property. con-
tract. and so forth-to all of its citizens. 
/d. at 1387-88. 
9. I defend this position in DONALD A. DRIPPS. ABOUT GL'IL T AND INNOCENCE 
147 (2003): 
Fourth Amendment analysis is now indistinguishable from an instrumental due 
process inquiry. except that the restrictive definitions of "searches and seizures" 
opens the door to unreasonable. yet constitutional. police investigations. Due 
process analysis could fill this unfortunate gap. while and "search .. or •·seizure .. 
that is ''reasonable" under the fourth Amendment should satisfy procedural due 
process standards as well (footnote omitted). 
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due process permitted them to do so, provided they did not re-
quire warrants for some classes of citizens but not others. And 
on the due process reading, what is "incorporated" would be the 
reasonableness clause alone, with warrants tagging along only 
when necessary to make especially intrusive searches and sei-
zures reasonable. 
It follows that Taslitz's invocation of the ''overwhelming 
weight" of informed opinion is somewhat misleading. Felix 
Frankfurter agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rates the Fourth, but in a very different sense than Taslitz has in 
mind. 10 The incorporation controversy (and yes, there is a con-
troversyt turns out to have very little to do with the Fourth 
Amendment, because some limits on state search-and-seizure 
practice follow from due process, whatever meaning we give to 
the privileges-and-immunities clause. That probably helps 
Taslitz's argument; if he were to take the total-incorporation po-
sition he would stand in favor of imposing the Seventh Amend-
ment jury requirement on state systems of workers' compensa-
tion, the Sixth Amendment jury requirement on state juvenile 
courts, and the grand jury requirement on that half of the states 
that authorize felony prosecutions by information. 
10. See Wolf v. Colorado. 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949) (Frankfurter. J.): 
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is 
at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore 
implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the 
States through the Due Process Clause. The knock at the door. whether by day 
or by night. as a prelude to a search, without authority of Jaw but solely on the 
authority of the police. did not need the commentary of recent history to be 
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the 
history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples. 
Accordingly. we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively 
to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guar-
anty of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the ways of enforcing such a basic 
right raise questions of a different order. How such arbitrary conduct should be 
checked, what remedies against it should be afforded. the means by which the 
right should be made effective. are all questions that are not to be so dogmati-
cally answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring from an allow-
able range of judgment on issues not susceptible of quantitative solution. 
11. See DRIPPS. supra note 9, at 27-36 (criticizing incorporation theory, largely 
relying on cases and treatises immediately following ratification); JAMES E. BOND. NO 
EASY WALK TO FREEDOM (1997) (reviewing ratification campaign in the South): 
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION 161 (1994) ("The selective 
incorporation doctrine ... is an invitation to unbridled judicial discretion, and must be 
ranked as one of the boldest and most astonishing acts of judicial usurpation in the his-
tory of the United States Supreme Court."); George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional 
Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 145 (2001) (criticizing incorporation theory, relying largely on proceed-
ings in Congress). The critics of incorporation may be outnumbered temporarily. but we 
are rather far from being overwhelmed. 
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I am not sure, but I think Tastlitz takes the position I con-
sider the strongest version available to him. All theories of the 
Fourteenth Amendment converge on the proposition that the 
amendment secures rights against arbitrary violence by state of-
ficials, including (if not limited to) violence that would violate 
the Fourth Amendment when committed by federal agents. He 
then adds the attractive claim that we should read the limits on 
both federal and state authority with a special regard for the 
abuses that inspired the Fourteenth Amendment: violence in-
tended to dominate a subordinate class defined by race, and, 
somewhat more particularly, limitations on personal mobility 
that were one feature of lower-caste status. 
From this springboard, Chapter 12 criticizes current doc-
trine for giving insufficient weight to collective rights against 
group subordination and individual rights to freedom of move-
ment, informational privacy, and against insult and humiliation. 
Taslitz is particularly critical of Supreme Court doctrine author-
izing the stop-and-frisk of suspects based solely on (1) presence 
in a high crime neighborhood and (2) unexplained flight from 
the police (pp. 267-73). He also criticizes order-maintenance po-
licing strategies as disproportionately oppressive, pointing to al-
ternative police practices that might be less oppressive and more 
respectful of the citizen than mass searches and arrests of the 
dysfunctional for petty offenses (p. 272). Finally, he complains 
about the limited right to privacy against government use of 
electronic data and home visits by child protection agents (pp. 
275-76). His treatment here is highly general, but seems to favor 
a reasonable-suspicion requirement for data acquisition and 
perhaps also for home visits to investigate child abuse. 
I now pursue two lines of critique. First, as a matter of his-
tory, Tastliz's focus on Reconstruction yields an incomplete pic-
ture of the legal ecology upon which the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was grafted. Second, as a matter of doctrine, his 
interpretive premises are both very vague and in tension with 
one another. They are so indeterminate that even if you adopted 
them, where you would come out on particular cases would still 
turn on basic and familiar choices about the relative value of 
freedom and security. 
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II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIRST 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 
During the nineteenth century a reform movement, Ben-
thamite in its content if not necessarily its pedigree,12 established 
professional police to keep order and investigate offenses, and 
professional prosecutors to screen, charge, and try cases. The 
grand jury became irrelevant wherever it was not abolished. As 
defense lawyers became more common, they became standard, 
either as a matter of supply and demand or judicial appointment 
for indigent defendants in serious cases. The defendant gained 
the right to testify, and shouldered the risk that the jury would 
take it amiss if he didn't. Prison replaced execution as the stan-
dard punishment. 
By 1868, the first municipal police departments in America 
had been founded, 11 and the first experiments with abolishing the 
defendant's incapacity to testify14 and with abolishing the grand 
jury1' were underway. Informed lawyers knew very well that the 
criminal justice system was changing, and they fully expected it 
to keep on changing. 16 
Until the 1960's the Supreme Court declined to read the 
Fourteenth amendment as incorporating the Fourth, Fifth and 
12. As Leon Radizinowicz put it. ··Impossible as this would have appeared to 
Betham. most of his proposed improvements in the law and the machinerv of justice have 
actuallv been introduced. although the fundamental tenets of his doctrine have by no 
means been universallv adopted."' LEON RADZINOWCIS. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
CRIMII'OAL LAW: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 175~1833. at 361 (1948) (footnote 
omitted). On Bentham's role in the movement for reform in America. see, e.g .. Ferguson 
v. Georgia. 365 U.S. 570 (1961 ). 
13. See, e.!( .. SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ. THE POLICE IN AMERICA 
ch. 4 (5th ed. 2004) (American municipal police departments first established in the 1830s 
and 1840s). 
14. See Fer!(uson. 365 U.S. at 577 ("The first statute was apparently that enacted by 
Maine in 1859 making defendants competent witnesses in prosecutions for a few 
crimes."). 
15. See. e.!(., Ric Simmons. Re-Examinin~< the Grand Jury: Is There Room for De-
mocracv in the Criminal Justice Svstem?. 82 B.U. L. REV. 1. 18 (2002) (Michigan abol-
ished requirement of grand jury indictment in 1859: "After the Civil War. reformers in 
nearlv everv state in the west and far west agitated for the abolition of the grand iurv, 
and they ultimatelv succeeded in abolishing the grand jury requirement in four states" 
(footnote omitted)). 
16. See, e.fi .. Hurtado v. California. 110 U.S. 516.531 (1884): 
There is nothinl! in Ma2.na Charta. ri2.htlv construed as a broad charter of oublic 
ri2.ht and law. which ou2.ht to exclude the best ideas of all svstems and of everv 
a2.e. and as it was the characteristic orinciole of the common law to draw its in-
soiration from everv fountain of iustice. we are not to assume that the sources of 
its suoolv have been exhausted. On the contrarv. we should exoect that the new 
and various exoeriences of our own situation and system will mould and shape it 
into new and not less useful forms. 
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Sixth. Taslitz is probably right to say that for some time now the 
orthodox historical position is that the Fourteenth was meant to 
incorporate the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth. The orthodox view, 
however, is seriously embarrassed by the history of criminal pro-
cedure. The flow of reform in the nineteenth century was under-
stood as a direct attack on the common-law process, and that 
flow was not broken by reconstruction and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Informed lawyers knew that the Bill of Rights criminal pro-
visions were under attack and they had no expectation whatever 
that the great struggle between Benthamism and the common 
law would be settled, constitutionally, by an amendment primar-
ily designed to empower Congress to legislate on race relations 
in the states of the defeated Confederacy. The orthodox view of 
incorporation makes some sense with respect to the first and 
second amendments. Only by turning a blind eye to the history 
of criminal justice in the nineteenth century can the orthodox 
position be extended to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth amendments 
(although in fairness it ought to be said that the history of crimi-
nal justice in the nineteenth century is only now emerging from 
the shadows of legal history). 
I tend to agree with Taslitz that modern search-and-seizure 
law gives insufficient protection to freedom of movement and 
against public humiliation. The reason current law slights these 
values, however, is not that the craven settlement of 1876 re-
pressed the memory of the Fourteenth Amendment's original 
progressive content. Benthamite reforms at odds with the Bill of 
Rights had their earliest successes in the North, not the South. 
Michi~an authorized accusation by information in felony cases in 
1859;1 Maine gave the defendant the right to testify in 1864.1s An 
important strand of progressive Northern opinion was hostile to 
the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and grand-jury clauses.19 
It was in the South, not the North, that the common-law 
process lasted the longest. Indeed some features of the old proc-
ess vanished from the South only when the Warren Court de-
17. See supra note 15. 
18. See DAVID M. GOLD. THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN 
APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM 61 (1990). California was the next state. 
approving defense testimony in 1866. /d. at 62. 
19. Opponents of per~itting defense testimony argued. among other things. that it 
would compel the accused to testify against himself. Benthamites like Appleton rather 
frankly admitted their hostility to the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 64-65. 
544 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:533 
dared them unconstitutional. FerRuson v. GeorRii0 held the 
common-law rule making the accused incompetent to give sworn 
testimony a violation of due process. WashinRton v. Texai 1 
struck down, on compulsory process and due process grounds, 
party-incompetence rules that had the effect of keeEing defense 
witnesses off the stand. Chambers v. Mississippi 2 discarded, 
again on both Sixth Amendment and due process grounds, the 
common-law prohibition of impeaching a witnesses called by the 
impeaching party. 
Benthamite attacks on the Bill of Rights reflected an attrac-
tive general theory separating substance from procedure and as-
signing procedure the limited role of accurate fact-finding. Con-
flict between this theory and the common law, which had over 
centuries evolved elaborate procedural obstacles to enforcing a 
sanguinary substantive law, was obvious. If the generation that 
framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment meant to leave 
resolution of the conflict between Benthamite reform and the 
common law criminal process to the political process-and the 
nationwide flow of reform successes through the turn of the cen-
tury very strongly suggests this understanding-then the Four-
teenth Amendment was not thought to impose the Fourth, Fifth 
and Sixth amendments, in terms, on the states. 
Another, uglier, strand of nineteenth century history bears 
mentioning with respect to the Fourth Amendment. Before, dur-
ing and after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, law-
less police brutality flourished in Northern cities that had never 
known slavery. This police violence, moreover, operated along 
class lines and was politically popular. In New York, 
"[c]omplaints of police violence date back to 1846, the NYPD's 
first full year of operation, when twenty-nine people filed com-
plaints with the city clerk charging that they had been assaulted 
by police officers. "23 During the second half of the nineteenth 
century, "hundreds of press accounts of police violence ... pre-
20. 365 u.s. 570 (1961) 
21. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See id. at 19: 
The right to offer the testimonv of witnesses. and to compel their attendance. if 
necessarv. is in plain terms the right to Present a defense. the right to present 
the defendant"s version of the facts as well as the prosecution·s to the iurv so it 
mav decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the 
prosecution·s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimonv. he has 
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fun-
damental element of due process of law. 
22. 410 u.s. 284 (1973). 
23. See MAR!L YNN S. JOHNSON. STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE 
VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY 15 (2003) 
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occupied New Yorkers."24 Police violence became an enduring 
topic of political debate during the Civil War. 20 
Police brutality, with the approval of the majority, was not 
confined to New York. In Chicago, following the Haymarket 
bombing in 1886, State's Attorney Julius Grinnell advised the 
police to "[m]ake the raids first and look up the law afterward!"26 
The police followed this advice with enthusiasm: 
Meeting halls, newspaper offices, and even private homes 
were invaded and ransacked for evidence. In two days more 
than fifty gathering places of anarchists and socialists were 
raided and persons under the slightest suspicion of radical af-
filiation arrested, in most cases without warrants and with no 
specific charge lodged against them ... The next few weeks 
saw the detention of hundreds of men and women, most of 
them foreigners, who were put through the "third degree" to 
extract information and confessions.27 
For example, police arrested one suspect and held him incom-
municado for eight days; during interrogation he was kept in a 
cramped, lightless "sweat box" for hours. 28 In the 1930s the 
Wickersham Commission would document similar abuses 
throughout the country.29 It is hard to believe that things had 
been better sixty years earlier. 
By terminating his study in 1868, Taslitz avoids any treat-
ment of post-ratification events. To the extent that the criminal 
justice system during Reconstruction was dynamic for independ-
ent causes, his choice is arbitrary and misleading. He relies on 
the views of the most enlightened of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's proponents, then ignores the repudiation of those views 
on the ground in the North. One particular instance is especially 
frustrating. Taslitz favors the exclusionary rule, but he misses a 
golden opportunity to explore its origins-which lie in the Boyd, 
Sheridan and Weeks decisions decades after 1868.30 
24. /d. at 13. 
25. /d. 
26. PAUL AVRICH. THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 221 (1986): JAMES GREEN. 
DEATH IN THE HAYMARKET (2006). 
27. AVRICH. supra note 26. at 221. 
28. GREEN. supra note 26. at 206. 
29. NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT. REPORT 
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931 ). 
30. See Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (statute presuming truth of for-
feiture allegations upon failure of claimants to produce relevant business records violates 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments): State v. Sheridan. 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903) (Boyd doc-
trine and state constitution require suppression of evidence obtained by execution of 
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The odious Southern slave apparatus deserves all the con-
demnation Taslitz (and anyone else) can heap upon it. The anal-
ogy between the slave system and brutal police practices might 
make good law, as analogies sometimes do. The analogy, how-
ever, is moral, not historical. The generation that ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment distinguished what was taking place in 
the North from what was taking place in the occupied South. 
Northern legislatures were authorizing direct departures from 
the Bill of Rights, and Northern courts were upholding these in-
novations against constitutional challenge." What these same 
legislatures did not do-impose meaningful restraints on the new 
police departments-is likewise suggestive of indifference or 
hostility toward individual rights against search and seizure. 
As a matter of history, then, Taslitz focuses exclusively on 
race and Reconstruction. These are terribly important topics for 
understanding the history of search and seizure, but they are not 
the only important topics. 
III. A FOG OF REASONS 
Current doctrine's successes-and failures-reflect the insti-
tutional realities impelling the Warren Court's criminal-
procedure revolution. The modern police force and the modern 
public prosecutor gave the instruments of social control un-
precedented powers, powers that were regularly abused and that 
legislatures had not seen fit to regulate. The judiciary stepped in 
to make law where none existed. To make the law of criminal 
procedure the Supreme Court had to issue constitutional rulings 
to govern millions of police-citizen encounters. The exclusionary 
rule gave the Court its only practical leverage over police con-
duct in the great majority of these cases, and so the law we have 
warrant for mere evidence); Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (Boyd requires 
pretrial return of papers seized in warrantless home search by federal agent). Judge Cas-
sel has noted that: 
The first state decision suppressing evidence was State v. Sheridan. 96 N.W. 730 
(Iowa 1903). In Sheridan. the Iowa court held that evidence obtained by a clear 
abuse of judicial process should be excluded under article I. § 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court overruled Sheridan in State v. Tonn. 
191 N.W. 530 (Iowa 1923). on the ground that strict application of the exclu-
sionary rule would thwart the proper administration of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 
Paul G. Cassell. The Mvsterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Un-
der State Constitutions: The Utah Example. 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751.806 n.351. 
31. See DRIPPS. supra note 9. at 31 (reviewing court decisions between 1866 and 
1884 rejecting state defendants" Bill of Rights claims. whether grounded directly on the 
Fourth. Fifth and Sixth amendments. or via incorporation under the Fourteenth). 
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slights personal security and exalts privacy because the exclu-
sionary rule does a much better job of protecting privacy than of 
protecting personal security.32 The primacy of judge-made law in 
the criminal procedure field in turn gives the determinacy of that 
judge-made law an importance that Taslitz's focus on the lost 
wisdom of the Framers might occlude. 
An ideal Fourth Amendment theory would satisfy three cri-
teria. It would be legitimate, drawing fair support from text and 
history. It would also be reasonable, matching the results of most 
cases with widely-shared contemporary norms. And it would, fi-
nally, be determinate, giving police and lower courts the guid-
ance they need to comply with the Constitution. The develop-
ment of such an ideal theory has proved very difficult. 
Reasonable people could dispute whether Taslitz has succeeded 
in meeting the first two criteria. My point here is that he clearly 
fails the third criteria. 
If one combines the seven "lessons of history" from the 
original Fourth Amendment (p. 71) with the ten "lessons of his-
tory" from the Fourteenth Amendment (pp. 258-62), one can 
construct as good an argument for one side as the other in most 
contested Fourth Amendment cases. Consider current stop-and-
frisk law, which authorizes brief detention for investigation cou-
pled with a protective frisk of suspects observed in unexplained 
flight from the police in "high crime neighborhoods. "33 Taslitz 
makes this practice the target of forceful criticism. Agreeing with 
a dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by three other 
Justices, he notes that experience of police abuse, especially 
among minority citizens, gives honest people good reason to flee 
(pp. 269-70). To the low probative value of flight, relied on by 
Stevens, Taslitz adds that prevailing doctrine's insensitivity to 
minority perspectives amounts to "silencing" that "crushes the 
human sense of self-worth, uniqueness, and autonomy" (p. 270). 
Finally, Taslitz criticizes prevailing doctrine for failing to recog-
nize "the value of free movement and the seriousness of inter-
ference with it" (p. 270). 
32. On privacy's arbitrary primacy in the positive law. see William J. Stuntz, Pri-
vacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995). 
33. Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). Technically speaking. it is possible that 
the stop might be justified but not a frisk. as when police suspect littering or a violation of 
the open container law. Given the "high crime neighborhood'' premise. however. police 
with cause for the stop will typically also have cause for the frisk. 
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Yet Taslitz also acknowledges "the obligation of the state to 
protect its citizens from private violence and of the people to 
protect itself from state violence" (p. 261 ). 
He notes the concern of the Reconstruction Congress with 
private violence against freed slaves and white unionists in the 
occupied South, commenting that "the challenge of protecting 
freedman from violence without eviscerating everyone's civil 
rights preoccupied the Reconstruction Congress" (p. 261 ). He 
proposes a least -restrictive-alternative theory to adjudicate the 
old conflict between freedom and safety. Yet the stop-and-frisk 
cases seem to satisfy that criteria. It is hard to see what suspi-
cious police can do to investigate a fleeing suspect without first 
stopping him. 
Moreover, Taslitz's concern for the expressive character of 
state violence applies also to the failure of the state to intervene. 
Randall Kennedy is only the most prominent voice to say that 
"blacks have suffered more from being left unprotected or under-
protected by law enforcement authorities than from being mis-
treated as suspects or defendants. "34 The image of police observ-
ing suspected gangsters jogging away unmolested would send a 
powerful message. Police abuse is only one source of the alien-
ation from state authority so prevalent in many poor communi-
ties. Police indifference or impotence is also a factor. 35 Yet an-
other factor is the quite rational prediction that police cannot 
keep secret the identity of those who inform against violent 
predators.30 One advantage of stop-and-frisk is that when the 
frisk turns up drugs or weapons, police testimony is sufficient to 
convict. 
Justice Thomas addressed the mobility point in his passion-
ate dissent in Chicago v. Morales, in which the majority held the 
city's anti-gang loitering law void for vagueness: "Gangs fill the 
daily lives of many of our poorest and most vulnerable citizens 
with a terror that the Court does not give sufficient considera-
tion, often relegating them to the status of prisoners in their own 
34. RANDALL KENNEDY. RACE. CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998). 
35. See, e.g .. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE 
AC'D THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 321 (1999). "Residents sometimes fail to call 
the police because they believe that the police are unlikely to come or, if they come, may 
even harass the very people who called them. This is an experience unfamiliar to most 
middle-class people ... 
36. See id. ("With this attitude many people are afraid to report obvious drug deal-
ing or other crimes to the police. for fear that the police might reveal their names and 
addresses to the criminals. It is thus better, many say. 'to see but don't see.'"). 
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homes."37 I disagreed with Justice Thomas's assessment of the 
legal issue in Morales, but his descriptive point has the ring of 
truth. Private violence does more than police violence to curtail 
the freedom of movement in poorer communities, especially the 
freedom of women, children, and those who are no longer 
young. 
So Taslitz has given us a lengthy list of lessons and princi-
ples, and given us how he would come out in some concrete 
cases. There does not, however, appear to be any determinate 
connection between the premises and the conclusions. 
t 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Taslitz illuminates the important historical con-
nection between search-and-seizure and racial oppression both 
before and after the Civil War. He shows that alternatives to to-
day's decisions can be found in text and history. He has not, 
however, given us a complete history of search and seizure in the 
nineteenth century. Nor has he set out an interpretive program 
that can be expected to persuade the skeptical to abandon their 
own positions. More than thirty years ago, in his celebrated 
Holmes Lectures, Anthony Amsterdam bluntly declared that the 
Fourth Amendment's ''language is no help and neither is its his-
tory."38 That judgment, in my view, still stands. 
37. Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 41. 99 (1999) (Thomas. J .. dissenting). 
38. Anthony Amsterdam. Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment. 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349.395 (1974). 
